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GORDON C. ZAHN

A RELIGIOUS PACIFIST LOOKS AT ABORTION





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Can the right to life be absolutized?

JACK PATTERSON **THE WALL OF ZONING**

ALAIN WOODROW **CONFUSION IN GENEVA**

CHARLES RABB **THE HOUSE PRIEST**

EUGENE C. KENNEDY **KAVANAUGH'S PROPHECY**

COLIN L. WESTERBECK JR. **ALL'S WELLES**

REVIEWS AND LETTERS: BISHOP SIMONS, RICHARD B. DuBOFF, WILSON CAREY McWILLIAMS, RALPH McINERNEY, GEORGE N. SHUSTER

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NEWS & VIEWS

Oil on the Waters

Secretary of State Rogers is at pains to leave the impression that reports of oil deposits off the shore of South Vietnam are so much idle speculation. But the reports refuse to die. They're still around—and, in fact, being fed by some interesting sources.

A recent issue of *Vietnam Bulletin,* for instance, features an article entitled, "Good Prospects in Vietnam for Off-Shore Oil Drilling." *Vietnam Bulletin* is the weekly letter of the South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington.

The State Department professes no knowledge of any plan to press ahead with oil exploration off South Vietnam, but *Vietnam Bulletin* cites one official as saying, "If it all goes well, wildcat drilling can begin by the end of 1971."

Indeed it could. The way was paved by Public Law 011/70 — "Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum and Related Taxation, Fees and Exchange Regulations" —issued last December by the Thieu-Ky government. The law opens the door to negotiations between South Vietnam and 21 interested companies, mostly American.

Whatever the State Department's mind, there's nothing idle obviously about South Vietnam's ideas concerning oil.

Nor is it likely that oil is a phony South Vietnamese lure. Admittedly South Vietnam has multiple reasons for wanting Uncle Sam to stick around when and if the war ends; if there's oil in them thar waters, South Vietnam's fortunes are made—politically as well as financially. Oil would make for a union as firm as war.

And chances are that there's oil under those waters. The soundings are good, and there's the fact of oil off Indonesia.

Some 900,000 barrels are now being pumped daily in Indonesian waters, not a large amount as oil goes, but plenty large enough to whet appetites and nourish notions about oil elsewhere in the region. There's the added enticement that this oil is exceptionally low in sulphur content—less than 1 percent against 3 percent-plus of Middle East crude—thus giving it major cost and pollution advantages.

Forbes magazine, an impeccable business source, stressed the cost and purity angles in an article sufficiently noteworthy to be picked up and recirculated by *Oil Digest,* another publication with pro-finance leanings.

The big question mark, of course, is the political stability of the area. As *Forbes*' sub-headline put it, "This economic dream may turn into a political nightmare." Yet for business interests, it's a necessary gamble. A veteran oilman sums up succinctly in *Forbes*: "We don't have the oil in the U.S. to meet our future requirements. Either we are going to have our future committed to those crazy Arabs or we are going to develop Southeast Asia. . . ."

The oilman listed other prospective development areas, but the fact that he named Southeast Asia first is not without significance. Eyes are fastened on the place.

The implications of oil in the Far East are enormous. Cynics are already suggesting that oil prospects dictate much of American policy in Southeast Asia, and even if these cynics are totally wrong in terms of the present and only half-right in terms of the future, we're in trouble. For it could mean that the U.S. may never be getting out of South Vietnam; we'll be locked in by oil rigs. Which could produce the supreme irony, that the war's blessing on the country was healthier and wealthier oil companies. . . . Not worth dying for, particularly.

More Bishops Speak

The stirring—belated but praiseworthy—continues in the Catholic episcopacy on the war.

Five bishops (Reed, Dougherty, Unterkoefler, Grossman, Gumbleton) and one cardinal (Shehan) joined in the interdenominational statement which charged that the nation suffers "a sickness of the spirit" traceable to the war and that it's time "to repent" for what is being done in Southeast Asia.

And in New England, 14 bishops jointly questioned the "wisdom and morality" of certain U.S. policies in Indochina, adding that they merit "the severest moral censure" where they've caused civilian deaths.

The New England bishops' declaration was carefully couched, but it made one important point as bluntly as it should be made:

"We must in conscience criticize the ethical value of any doctrine, attitude or policy which seems to give American lives an intrinsic superiority over those of other people."

It's something for Mr. Nixon to ponder next time he is justifying everything in terms of "saving American lives."



Seles, *Magyar Szo,* Yugoslavia

Dow Rolls On

A resolution offered to stockholders of Dow Chemical to preclude the manufacture of napalm got drubbed —65,000 votes in favor to more than 22 million against.

Since the resolution gained less than 3 percent of the vote, it cannot be resubmitted for three years. That's a Securities and Exchange Commission regulation.

The voting took place in conjunction with Dow's annual meeting.

Dow, meanwhile, declared a three-for-two stock split and increased its cash dividend 10 cents a share annually.

Odds and Ends

—Dr. Herbert F. York, former chief scientist of the Pentagon, now an activist for disarmament, provides a graphic picture of where we're at in the arms race.

When the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Aug. 6, 1945, one bomber commander controlled the power to destroy a single medium-sized city. Today the commander of a nuclear submarine (e.g., U.S.S. Madison), with 16 Poseidon missiles aboard, each with 10 or more warheads, "controls the power to subject 150 cities each to several times the destructive force unleashed on Hiroshima."

If that doesn't depress you, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has announced that the world's military spending reached a record $204 billion last year. That's the dollar equivalent of a year's income produced by the 1.8 billion people in the poorer half of the world's population.

JOHN DEEDY

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CORRESPONDENCE

Grassroots Women's Lib?

Halifax, N.S.

To the Editors: Thanks for the special Easter putdown of Dr. Mary Daly, in your correspondence column [Apr. 9]. The first letter sounded like the classical male chauvinist attempt to laugh her out of court. The second sounded more reasonable, but still missed the point. Many of Patricia Young's comments seem valid; yet Ms. Young must surely realize that the "massive program of education" she advocates will never materialize without an intelligent and highly reasoned articulation of its aims and objectives.

A woman like me, for example, cannot draw on Kieran Quinn or Patricia Young for desperately needed support. I can and do find support, sanity, and hope in every article of Mary Daly's that I have ever seen. Without these, I would despair. In Canada, the Catholic church is currently organizing its opposition to the very moderately-worded Report on the Status of Women. The church has not commented specifically on the many reasonable recommendations in the Report (I strongly suspect it hasn't even been read); yet even on Easter Sunday, we have to be warned about "the CANCER of the women's right's movement" (The heavy type isn't mine: it came from the Archdiocesan Church Bulletin). As for me, the more sickened I become, the more I plan to say about it. In order to clarify and develop my own thinking, I *need* Mary Daly. Please don't put her down.

JANET CARNEY

Cambridge, Mass.

To the Editors: Reacting to Patricia Young's correspondence on Mary Daly's article [Apr. 9], I feel that she found no receptive women in her parish club because intelligent young Catholic women, having recognized the well-established anti-female practices of the church, have already left the church. The women who are aware of ecclesi-

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INTERNATIONAL ROUNDUP

For the moment international politics seem to have come unstuck. The most spectacular instance was of course the Great Ping-Pong Revolution in relations between Washington and Peking. On the other side of the world, Europe was badly shaken up by the latest currency crisis, and whether the end result is to weaken or strengthen the Common Market, all one can say for the moment is that European unity has suddenly been given top billing on the diplomatic marquee. The shift in France's attitude at Brussels which led to agreements on such items as British tea and sugar may have marked an historic breakthrough even greater than that involving Chinese ping pong balls. At the same time, America's position toward Europe has not only been put on the agenda by our continuing monetary troubles but also by Senator Mansfield's insistence that *this time* he was finally going to bring the question of withdrawing half of the 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe to a vote. One other event, now buried by the headlines of succeeding weeks, posed in new terms the long-term relationship between industrialized and developing nations, namely last April's bargaining over oil prices between Western consumers and Middle Eastern and African producers.

The China episode suggested that international relations may be as much the province of drama critics and sportswriters as geo-strategists and weapons experts. Perhaps the most astounding—really, almost frightening—aspect of the turn-around was the apparent enthusiasm of U.S. public opinion. Overnight, it seemed, the nation whose aggressive designs supposedly necessitated all the bloodshed of Vietnam was "just folks." When Mr. Nixon worries about a post-Vietnam reaction of public opinion (for which his own statements too often appear to provide a stimulus), he ought to recall what a little leadership could do in the China instance. Apart from that, however, his Administration deserves credit for its careful groundwork; it surely realizes that a new era in U.S.-China relations will not be built on a burst of good feeling alone, but on a reasonable estimate of the interests of both nations in issues like Taiwan, Southeast Asian security, and nuclear weapons policy. Perhaps at last we are recognizing that China is not a demon nor a problem to be "solved" but a great nation to be lived with.

On the European question, Senator Mansfield's troop-withdrawal proposal became entangled with numerous other issues such as the tug of war between

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Senate and President in foreign policy making. U.S. troops in Europe hardly seem like the most likely candidates for withdrawal by year's end. Except as an economy measure—and in that line better ones come easily to mind—the Mansfield resolution seems less a practical step than a prod for further Washington consideration of its relations with an independent and restive continent no longer fearful of a Soviet invasion. Foggy Bottom might start with an honest estimation of the long-term cost of supporting fascism in Greece.

The oil negotiations, in which producing countries finally got together to put the bite on consumers, immediately stimulated calls for counter-organization among the industrial nations. From the viewpoint of self-interest, such calls make sense. But is self-interest the acceptable viewpoint? The oil settlement held out the hope that developing nations, like workers in the 19th and early 20th centuries, might be able to organize and win the concessions which, "Development Decade" rhetoric notwithstanding, will not be handed them on a silver platter. The developing nations cannot depend on largesse; they need power, and a few of them are fortunate to have leverage in the form of oil supplies. At the first flexing of the poor's muscles, are we going to hasten to strengthen the bosses' power?

Roman Collar In the House

This reporter, preparing for his interview the next morning with Rep. Robert F. Drinan, Democrat of Massachusetts, Jesuit priest and former dean of the Boston College law school, noticed a sameness in the clips. High up in the story came The Question: Should a priest be in Congress? And, usually later: Did he see any conflict between being priest and Congressman in looking at such issues as aid to education and birth control?

Rep. Drinan, obviously weary of the inevitable question and having the answer virtually committed to rote by sheer repetition, responds along the lines of last Nov. 15 on ABC's "Issues and Answers": "No, really, I say all the time there is no inconsistency between Catholicism and Americanism. We have long assumed since the founding of the Republic that Protestantism and Americanism somehow go together and I suggest that Judaism and Catholicism is the same way; that if a person adheres to that faith and then takes his oath to the Constitution, then he does what is in the common interest or the public good."

Another oft-asked question: What should he be called? Another familiar answer: "I'm reminded of the lawyer who said, 'I don't care what they call me as long as they call me.'" At a Capitol Hill press conference, his answer was: "Bobby." Actually Rep. Drinan prefers the title of Congressman. The phone is answered this way: "Good afternoon, Congressman Drinan's office." Most people around the Capitol, however, call him Father.

In his relatively remote fifth floor office in the Cannon Office Building, Rep. Drinan left little doubt that he had immersed himself totally in his new role. The words poured out rapidly as the lean, energeitc figure demonstrated that he preferred a career of activism to the life of a law school dean.

From the confident way he approaches his committee duties, it is obvious that Rep. Drinan is not beset by any doubts. A member of the House Internal Security Committee (formerly the House Un-American Activities Committee), which he feels should be abolished since it serves no legislative purpose, Rep. Drinan already has clashed with its chairman at a hearing. Much to the annoyance of Chairman Richard H. Ichord, D-Mo., Drinan identified in a television interview a committee witness testifying on Red Chinese restrictions on freedom as an employee of Voice of America. The freshman lawmaker not only refused to backtrack at a subsequent committee meeting, but said in a heated exchange with Ichord that he would continue to make such disclosures until the committee stopped old practices or voted to stop him.

When he is in Washington, Rep. Drinan lives in the Jesuit community at Georgetown University, which in a sense is homecoming since he was graduated from the University and its law school. Like most freshmen, and perhaps more so than most, he has to pay close attention to the needs of his constituents in a district which embraces 31 communities and stretches from Central Massachusetts to Newton and Waltham, just outside Cambridge. In his frequent visits to the district he concentrates on the many Catholics who preferred either of his two more hawkish opponents to him and tries to win them over on economic issues.

With an eye already to next year's expected tough race, he is relying on William G. Flynn, former mayor of Fitchburg, to help him keep in touch with his large district. Flynn is his administrative assistant. Martin Michaelson, once a Wall Street lawyer, is his legislative assistant. These are the two key posts in the Congressional office.

Meanwhile, Rep. Drinan, resigned to being scrutinized as the first Roman Catholic clergyman ever elected to Congress, continues to set a vigorous and energetic pace in the House. Though on Capitol Hill only a few months, he and the other activist newcomers, such as Reps. Ronald V. Dellums, D-Calif., and Bella S. Abzug, D-N.Y., have helped shake the House's customary attitude of unquestioned support for the Administration's —any administration's—Vietnam war policy. It may not seem like much but it hasn't happened in the House since the Gulf of Tonkin.

CHARLES RABB

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EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY

CLERICAL CONFUSION IN GENEVA

Geneva

"We have serious reservations with regard to the representativity, preparation and working methods of the European assembly of 'official' priests." This was the reason given by the international group of "dissenting" priests (*prêtres solidaires*) last month in Louvain, to explain their decision to boycott the European Assembly of priest delegates, held in Geneva from April 20 to 23rd.

It's bad enough trying to arouse a spark of interest in the endless debates, congresses, forums and general blather that abound at all levels of the institutional church—when, heaven knows, it is faced with enough real problems in the world today to keep it busy until Doomsday—without having to contend with warring clerical factions as well!

Having got this personal aside off my chest, let's see what happened at Geneva. First of all, it is only fair to say that the dissenting priests' fears were not completely groundless. The European assembly was scarcely representative (assuming that such a thing is possible). The method of choosing the delegates varied from country to country, ranging from Ireland, where the elderly and largely conservative delegation was simply nominated by the bishops, to Holland, where the democratic election of the delegates led to the amusing result that one of their number, Jost Reuten, happens also to be president of the very radical Septuagint movement. The number of delegates per country varied also, according to the number of existing priest councils. Italy, for example, where such councils are regarded as an eccentric whim, was only able to muster two "observers."

The preparation of the conference was equally erratic. Not only were the Eastern European countries entirely absent from the proceedings (the 75 delegates came from 16 Western European countries), but the questionnaire, which was the basis of the discussions and was supposed, in theory, to have been answered by all the European priest councils, ended up as often as not in a clerical, or episcopal, wastebasket. In France, for example, out of 92 dioceses, only 42 filled in the questionnaire; 25 explicitly refused to do so and the remaining 25 didn't even bother to reply. . . .

As for the conference's working methods, it will suffice to quote the anguished cry of the only American observer present, who said to me, "These guys don't know anything about parliamentary procedure! We Americans often consider the European church as avant-garde, but the priests I spoke with don't seem to have heard of the great European theologians that we swear by in the States. As for the debates, they ought to see how we handle a meeting of several *thousand* priests!"

The results of the Geneva assembly can be considered on two levels. Firstly, there were six reports, prepared by the different delegations and based on the national replies to the preliminary questionnaire. Then there were the fifty or so resolutions, hammered out after discussion of the reports and voted (two-thirds majority needed) before being included in the final text to be presented in Rome, in view of the bishops' Synod to be held next October.

On the first level, the reports included a wide variety of opinions, since they were a synthesis of the national replies. If one bears in mind the limitations already mentioned, they give a general picture of the European clergy's position with regard to the priesthood—a position which boils down to a general agreement in favor of a greater pluriformity of the priestly ministry. On the second level, the resolutions voted by the assembly were naturally more restrictive and middle-of-the-road, since they reflected the more limited character of the delegations present. Here, briefly, are the salient points of the six topics under discussion, arising from the reports and resolutions.

1. *Church and priests challenged by the modern world.* The report, presented by the French delegation, showed a marked divergence, notably between the Anglo-Saxons and the rest, on the priest's political and social commitment. The British and the Irish insisted on the priest's spiritual mission, whilst the Dutch deplored the separation between the "priest" and the "man." As one Dutch delegate put it, "I am a man before being a priest and I have no right to isolate myself from men who hunger and thirst after justice." The resolutions voted on this topic adopt a balanced position, stressing on the one hand that the priestly ministry is not primarily political or social, and on the other that the priest cannot remain uncommitted in the face of injustice or oppression.

2. *The priest's ministry and mission.* The report, presented by the Spanish delegation, surprised the assembly by its forthright tone. Indeed, it went straight to the heart of the problem without mincing its words. "It would be a tragedy," stated the *rapporteur,* "if the forthcoming Synod should carry out its deliberations under the disastrous illusion that the priest's basic problem is a theological crisis. It is, in fact, a crisis of ecclesiastical institutions that are still geared to an obsolete rural civilization. We are faced with a bureaucratic organization foreign to the Gospel, and a crisis in our relations with an authority that is more feudal than Christian. It is a crisis of faith." Although the strong language was toned

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down, the same idea persists in the resolutions passed on this subject.

3. *The priest's work.* The report, presented by the Belgian delegation, reveals the widespread dichotomy between the priesthood considered as an authentic profession, requiring the necessary training, social position and salary, and the possibility for the priest to engage in full- or part-time "secular" work. Both conceptions have their partisans among the European clergy, but the majority are agreed that the priest's traditional pastoral activity is "an authentic and useful profession, even in the eyes of non-Christians." The resolutions insist on the importance of the priest's insertion into our secularized world, and the necessary training for this; but they also plead for a greater pluriformity of the priestly ministry to allow those priests who wish to take up secular employment.

4. *The priest's celibacy.* The first thing that emerges from the report, presented by the German and Austrian delegations, is the unanimous proposal (except for Britain and Norway) that the "evolution of the present legislation should depend on the episcopal conferences, according to local pastoral conditions and taking into account the opinion of the People of God." All the countries which answered the questionnaire were in favor of the ordination of married men. But they were much more divided on the vexed question of allowing priests who marry to continue their ministry. Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and Holland were more or less in favor, under certain clearly defined conditions, whilst Britain, Ireland, French-speaking Belgium and France were opposed to the idea. During the debate, the Dutch spokesman stressed the urgency of the matter, both with regard to the increasing number of priests leaving their ministry and the growing scarcity of candidates to the priesthood.

One thing is clear, however. The great majority of European priests do not accept the present limitations set by the Pope, who only considers the possibility of ordaining married men in exceptional and localized cases. A proposition, made by the Dutch delegation, to accept the recent statement on celibacy of the American Federation of Priests' Senates was rejected by the assembly and, in fact, the final resolutions are much more cautious than the report. While the ordination of married men is asked for "according to local needs," no mention is made of allowing priests who marry to continue their ministry. One resolution does, however, ask that the recent Roman document on laicization be redrafted by the Synod, and that the power to dispense a priest from his promise of celibacy be accorded to the episcopal conferences.

5. *Authority and leadership in the church* and 6. *Priestly training.* These last two reports, presented respectively by the British and Dutch delegations, gave rise to little debate, except, in the first case, for the objection to the statement that the Pope enjoys an "absolute right" in the appointment of bishops ("absolute" was removed from the final resolution) and, in the second, for the amendment introduced by the Irish on the merits of the present seminary system. This amendment was rejected by the assembly, as was a previous one, also advanced by the indefatigable Irish, who wanted to add to the resolutions on the priest's ministry: "The mission of the priest is principally to preach the Gospel, to exercise a pastoral ministry among the faithful, and to celebrate divine worship." This was rejected as being too clerical and some even said "pre-conciliar." What they didn't know was that the phrase had been lifted straight out of *Lumen Gentium*!

The resolutions on this fifth point insist above all on the need for collegiality at all levels of the church; on the responsibility implied in the exercise of authority; on the need for consultation in the appointment of bishops; on the need for due process in solving conflicts between priests and bishops, etc. The resolutions on priestly training, finally, lay stress on the importance for the priest to emerge from, and be accepted by, a local Christian community, and the need for much more diversified forms of training. On the question of the ordination of women, the resolution simply states that "this question should remain open and be allowed to mature."

Summing Up

Is it possible to sum up this mass of verbiage? First of all, one can deplore the almost total absence of lay observers (especially women) and of non-Catholics. There was a handful of bishops present, but they remained discreetly in the background, as did the "eye of Rome," whom I was assured was busy preparing his secret report for the Vatican. The only mildly exciting moment was when the Belgian and Dutch delegations proposed a letter to the Pope, expressing pained regret over his barely veiled comparison, during a Maundy Thursday sermon, of those priests who have left the ministry to Judas, "symbol of treason." After much twittering, and raising of points of order, it was rejected by 52 votes to 20, in spite of the deferential language in which the letter was couched.

The overall impression of the conference was one of confusion and lassitude (which, it might be pointed out, is an accurate reflection of the present state of the church). If a consensus was reached (and most of the resolutions passed easily by more than a two-thirds majority), it was a consensus of compromise. The delegates were above all in agreement on the fact that there exists no stereotype for the priest of tomorrow and that a diversification of the priestly ministry is an urgent necessity. In other words, they agree to differ. Sad to say, it is more than likely that the Roman Synod will not even go that far.

ALAIN WOODROW

(*Alain Woodrow is a member of the staff of* Informations Catholiques Internationales.)

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A RELIGIOUS PACIFIST LOOKS AT ABORTION

Can one absolutize the right to life?

GORDON C. ZAHN

Prudence, if nothing else, would seem to dictate that a celibate male, especially one committed to pacifism, should avoid getting embroiled in controversy with the women's liberation crowd. Ordinarily I would be all set to go along with this and not only for reasons of such prudential restraint. I am in general agreement with the movement's objectives and principles and more than ready to give it the benefit of almost every doubt—even though I do wish at times that its principal spokesmen (?) could be a little more, if not "ladylike," at least gentlemanly in their rhetoric and tone. But these are minor reservations.

There is one point of substance, however, on which I must register strong disagreement, and that is the increasing emphasis being placed on "free abortion on demand" as a principal plank in the liberationists' platform. From my perspective as a religious pacifist, I find this proposal thoroughly abhorrent; and I am disturbed by the willingness of so many who share my political and theological approach in most respects to go along with or condone a practice which so clearly contradicts the values upon which that approach is based.

In the past I have criticized "establishment" Christians, in particular official Catholic ecclesiastical and theological spokesmen, for their hypersensitivity to the evil of killing the unborn and their almost total disregard of the evil of "post-natal" abortion in the form of the wholesale destruction of human life in war. The argument works both ways and with equal force: those of us who oppose war cannot be any less concerned about the destruction of human life in the womb.

GORDON C. ZAHN, *author of* War, Conscience and Dissent *and* The Military Chaplaincy, *teaches sociology at the Univ. of Massachusetts.*

In discussing this issue from a pacifist standpoint I do not intend to enter upon two controversies which, though clearly related to the problem of abortion, are somewhat peripheral to my essential concern for life and the reverence for life. Thus, the whole question of the morality of contraception, obviously one of the alternatives to abortion as a means of population control, involves moral principles of an altogether different order. More closely related but also excluded from consideration here is the legal question, that is whether or not anti-abortion legislation now on the statute books should be repealed, modified, or retained. One can argue, as I shall here, that abortion is immoral and still recognize compelling practical and theoretical reasons for not using state authority to impose a moral judgment that falls so far short of universal acceptance within the political community. On the other hand, there are equally compelling arguments upholding legal prohibition of what has long been considered by many to be a form of murder; and this takes on added force to the extent that repeal of laws already in effect will be interpreted as official authorization of the hitherto forbidden practice. Since the intention here is to discuss the objections to abortion itself, this very important legal question will be left for others to debate and resolve.

Nor will I comment upon what I consider the tactical blunder on the part of the liberationists to "borrow trouble" by making so touchy an issue—on emotional as well as moral grounds—a central part of their program. I must, however, reject the rationale that is usually advanced to support their demands, the "property rights" line which holds that because a woman's body is "her own," she and she alone must be left free to decide what is to be done about the developing fetus. Leaving

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aside the obvious fact that the presence of the fetus suggests a decision that could have been made earlier, this line of argument represents a crude reversion to the model of *laissez-faire* economics Catholics of a liberal or radical persuasion have long since repudiated. Even if one were to accept the characterization of a woman's body as "property" (is it not one of the liberationists' complaints that men and man-made laws have reduced her to that status?), the claim to absolute rights of use and disposal of that property could not be taken seriously. The owner of a badly needed residential building is not, or at least *should not be*, free to evict his tenants to suit a selfish whim or to convert his property to some frivolous or non-essential use. In such a case we would insist upon the traditional distinction which describes property as private in ownership but social in use.

To use another example, the moral evil associated with prostitution does not lie solely, perhaps not even primarily, in the illicit sex relationship but, rather, in the degradation of a person to precisely this status of a "property" available for "use" on a rental or purchase basis. It is a tragic irony that the advocates of true and full personhood for women have chosen to provide ideological justification for attitudes which have interfered with recognition of that personhood in the past.

This is not to say, of course, that a woman does not have prior rights over her own body but only that the exercise of those rights must take into account the rights of others. In monogamous marriage this would preclude a wife's "freedom" to commit adultery (a principle, it should be unnecessary to add, which applies to the husband as well). Similarly, in the case of a pregnancy in wedlock, the husband's rights concerning the unborn child must be respected too; indeed, even in a pregnancy out of wedlock, the putative father retains parental rights to the extent that he is ready to assume his share of responsibility for the child's future needs. In both cases, and this is the crux of the argument, of course, the rights of the unborn child, perhaps the most important claimant of all, must be respected and protected.

Human Rights

These categories of rights, I insist, are not to be put in any "property rights" or similar economic frame of reference. They represent elementary human rights arising out of an intimacy of union between responsible persons which transcends purely utilitarian or proprietary considerations. The governing consideration as far as the unborn child is concerned is simply this: when do these rights come into existence? The answer offered here, and I think it is the only answer compatible with a pacifist commitment, is that they exist at the moment of conception marking the beginning of the individual's life processes.

This has nothing to do with the old theological arguments over whether or not the soul can be said to be present at conception; it rests completely upon the determination of whether or not there is now something "living" in the sense that, given no induced or spontaneous interferences, it will develop into a human person. We know for certain that this fertilized ovum is not going to develop into a dog or cat or anything else: whatever its present or intervening states, it will at the end emerge as a human child. One need only consider the usual reaction to a spontaneous or accidental termination of a *wanted* pregnancy. The sorrow of the prospective parents, a sorrow shared by friends and relatives alike, testifies not only to the fact that something has "died" but, also, that this "something" was human.

So, too, with the medical arguments over when the fetus becomes "viable" and, therefore, eligible for birth. It is the life that is present, not the organism, which should concern us most. Once we agree that society's origin and purpose lie in the fulfillment of human capacities and needs, we have established the basis for a reverence for life which goes far beyond such purely technical determination. Should a life once begun be terminated (whether before or after the point of viability) because the prospective mother did not have adequate food and care or because she was forced by the demands of her social or economic condition to undergo excessive physical or psychological strain, we would have no problem about charging society with a failure to meet its responsibility. There is no reason to change this judgment when the termination is brought about by deliberate act, either to avoid some personal inconvenience or to serve what may be rationalized into the "greater good" of the family unit or, as the eugenicist might put it, society as a whole. Just as rights begin with the beginning of the life process, so does society's obligation to protect them.

Recently a new and somewhat terrifying "viability" test has been proposed in arguments supporting abortion. No longer is it to be the stage of physiological development which determines whether or not life is to be terminated but rather the degree to which "personhood" has emerged or developed. Although strict logic might suggest that personhood can be established only after the fetus has entered upon its extra-uterine existence (that is, after the child has been born) advocates of this new test are apparently willing to extend it back into the later weeks of pre-natal development as well.

Two objections to this test should be immediately obvious. In the first place (and the "generous allowance" of pre-natal personhood serves as a good illustration of this point), we are caught up with the same old problems of judgment that plagued the older viability standards: if the fetus is to be considered viable at x-weeks, what about the day before that period is completed? If personhood can be manifested in the pre-natal period when, let us say, fetuses can be compared in terms of differential

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activity, what about the hour before such differences can be noticed? Is more activity a sign that personhood is advanced, or might the absence of much activity be a sign of equal, though different, emergence of personhood?

The second objection is even more troubling. Under the old notion of physiological viability, the child once born was unquestionably viable. The same may not be true—or may not remain so in the face of changing social definitions—once the emergence or development of personhood is the measure. My experience as a conscientious objector in World War II doing alternate service in a home for mental deficients introduced me to literally hundreds of individuals whose state of retardation was such that they could be described as "animals" or even "vegetables" by members of the institutional staff. Later, working in a hospital for mental diseases, I attended paretic and senile patients who had reached the state of regression and psychological deterioration at which the same terms could be applied to them and their behavior. However ardent and sincere the disclaimers may be, applying the test of personhood to the unborn is certain to open the way to pressures to apply that same test to the already born. In this sense, then, abortion and euthanasia are ideological twins.



In the old theological formulations of the problem, the condemnation of abortion was justified in terms of the "sanctity" or the "intrinsic worth" of human life. Today much of the argument supporting abortion rests upon similar abstractions applied now to the intrinsic worth of the prospective mother's life or of siblings whose living standards and life-chances might be threatened by the additional pregnancy. These are valid concerns and deserve serious and sympathetic understanding; and society does have a responsibility to find answers to these problems that do not involve the sacrifice of the human life that has begun. Pacifism and opposition to abortion converge here, for both find their ultimate justification in the Christian obligation to revere human life and its potential and to respect all of the rights associated with it.

The developmental model used by those who propose emergence of personhood as the test is basically sound, but as used by the advocates of abortion it becomes a logical enormity arguing for a development from an undefined or unstipulated beginning. A more consistent approach would see human life as a continuity from the the point of clinically determined conception to the point of clinically determined death. This physiological lifespan is then convertible to an existential framework as a developmental pattern of dependence relationships: at the earliest stages of a pregnancy the dependence is total; as the fetus develops, it takes on some of its own functions; at birth, its bodily functions are physiologically independent, but existential dependency is still the child's dominant condition. The rest of the pattern is obvious enough. As the individual matures and achieves the fullness of personhood, both functional and behavioral independence become dominant (though never total; culture and its demands must be taken into account). Finally, advanced age and physical decline returns him to a state of dependency which may, at the end, approximate that of his earliest childhood.

Society's responsibilities to the individual stand in inverse relationship to the growth and decline of his independence and autonomy. It would follow, then, that the immorality of abortion (and euthanasia as well) lies precisely in the fact that they propose to terminate the life process when the dependency is most total, that it would do so with the approval or authorization of society, that it would seek to justify this betrayal of society's responsibility on purely pragmatic grounds. The various claims made for the social utility of abortion (reducing the threat of over-population and now pollution; sparing the already disadvantaged family the strain of providing for yet another mouth; etc.) or the even less impressive justifications in terms of personal and all too often selfish benefits to the prospective parent(s) have to be put in this context; and once they are, they lose much of their force.

The earlier reference to the sorrow caused by the loss through miscarriage of a wanted child does not obscure the fact that most abortion proposals are concerned with preventing the birth of unwanted children. No one will deny that being regarded as an unwanted intruder in the family circle will be psychologically if not always physically harmful, but there should be other solutions to this problem than "sparing" the intruder this unpleasantness by denying him life in the first place. If a child is "unwanted" before conception, science has provided sufficient means for avoiding the beginning of the life process.

Since the sexual enlightenment burst upon us a generation or so ago, we have replaced the old Victorian notions about "the mystery of sex" with a kind of mechanistic assumption that man is the helpless victim of his chemistry and unconscious impulses, an assumption which reduces sexual intercourse to a direct, natural, and almost compulsive response to stimuli and situations.

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The other side of this particular coin is the not so hidden danger that man himself will be redefined in strictly biological terms, a largely accidental event brought into being by the union of two adult organisms acting in response to that irresistible urge. This is reflected in many of the statements made by advocates of abortion in their references to the conceived child as a "fertilized ovum." The term is perfectly accurate in the strictly physiological sense; in the Christian perspective, however, it leaves something to be desired.

The act of intercourse, like any other human act, is and must remain subject to human responsibility. This means that those who enter upon it should consider the possible consequences of the act and acknowledge re-

sponsibility for those consequences if and when they come to pass. Ideally this would mean that unwanted children would not be conceived; where the ideal is not achieved —or where the participants change their minds after the child is conceived —it will be society's obligations to assume the responsibility for the new life that has been brought into being.

Unwanted pregnancies resulting from a freely willed and voluntary act of sexual intercourse are one thing; those resulting from rape require special consideration. Even here, I would hold, the reverence for life which forms the basis of this pacifist rejection of abortion would preclude the intentional termination of the life process begun under such tragic circumstances. The apparent harshness of this position may be mitigated somewhat by reflecting that pregnancies attributable to true rape (or incest) represent a small proportion of the unwanted. Certainly they do not constitute a large enough proportion to justify the emphasis placed upon them by proponents of abortion. This provides small consolation to the victim who has already undergone the physically and psychologically traumatic experience of the assault itself and must still suffer the consequences of an act for which she bears no active responsibility. Nevertheless, the life that has begun is a human life and must be accorded the same rights and protection associated with the life resulting from normal and legitimate conceptions. Here again society must do what it can to provide all possible assistance to the victim including compensation (if one can speak of "compensation" in this context!) for the sacrifice she has been called upon to make. In most cases we must assume the mother will not want to keep the child after birth, at which point society's responsibility for its future development will become complete. If a mother does decide to keep her child, society will still have the obligation to make some continuing provision for adequate care and support.

The position I have outlined here has been described as unrealistic and even irresponsible in that it absolutizes the right of every "fertilized ovum" to develop, as one critic put it, "in a planet which can no longer support that kind of reproduction and where it threatens the possibility of realizing the lives which exist." The adjectives unrealistic and irresponsible do not trouble me; they are fairly standard descriptions of the pacifist approach, and this is a pacifist case against abortion. What does trouble me is the rest of the criticism. The ability or inability of the planet to support present and projected population totals is still a contested issue, and even if the prospects were as desperate as the statement suggests, the question would still remain as to whether the termination of unborn life is a desirable or acceptable solution. And as for the "realization" of the life which exists, it is essential to face the prior question of who is to determine what that involves and by what standards. How long, we must ask, before the quotas now being set in terms of "zero population growth" and similar *quantitative* formulae are refined by eugenic selectionists into *qualitative* quotas instead? This is not an idle fear, and one would think that a movement dedicated to the elimination of long-standing inequalities based on the qualitative distinction of sex should be particularly sensitive to the possibility.

Beyond this there is that matter of "absolutizing" the right to life, and to this I am ready to plead guilty. At a time when moral absolutes of any kind are suspect and the fashions in theological and ethical discourse seem to have moved from situationalism to relativism and now to something approximating indifferentism, it strikes me as not only proper but imperative that we proclaim the value of every human life as well as the obligation to respect that life wherever it exists—if not for what it is at any given moment (a newly fertilized ovum; a convicted criminal; the habitual sinner) at least for what it may yet, with God's grace, become.

It is not just a matter of consistency; in a very real sense it is the choice between integrity and hypocrisy. No one who publicly mourns the senseless burning of a napalmed child should be indifferent to the intentional killing of a living fetus in the womb. By the same token, the Catholic, be he bishop or layman, who somehow finds it possible to maintain an olympian silence in the face of government policies which contemplate the destruction of human life on a massive scale, has no right to issue indignant protests when the same basic disregard for human life is given expression in government policies permitting or encouraging abortion.

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THE WALL OF ZONING

The new front for zealous guardians of suburban racial and economic purity

JACK PATTERSON

For long-range social impact, the fight shaping up over exclusionary suburban zoning ranks with that over school integration. As public issues they share many similarities. Both are complex, ramified and emotion-laden. As with school integration, the initial assault on zoning has come not through legislatures or executive action but through the courts. Social action groups—the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing and the Suburban Action Institute—are asking the courts to force a recalcitrant white majority—this time, in the nation, not simply the South—to act counter to its wishes.

We see the politicians from President Nixon on down dodging the flak fired by angry and frightened suburban home-owners, with those zealous guardians of suburban racial and economic purity, the real estate fraternity, giving aid and comfort. "Community rights" is replacing "state rights" as a new rallying cry. The intent is the same: To assert local will over the needs of the larger community, the nation. Zoning is the new white barricade.

Court action against zoning will likely not produce a single decision, comparable to *Brown versus Board of Education*, outlawing all discriminatory zoning. The recent Supreme Court decision on a housing case from San Jose, California indicates that the present Court is not eager to make a leap from the economic discrimination of many present zoning ordinances to the effective racial discrimination that ensues. Even if the courts can be persuaded to breach the zoning barricade, success may prove again, as school integration proved, that courts are poor engines of social change. They provide essential battering rams to shatter entrenched resistance. But they are necessarily poorly equipped to cope with the manifold problems their decisions engender.

Communities, states and the federal government could, of course, move ahead of the courts, sparing the country extended social conflict and turmoil. Zoning reform should be linked to local tax reform and to plans for rational urban growth. But such action would demand foresight and political courage, qualities as rare in local government as at the highest seat of power in Washington.

President Nixon, for example, has made one thing perfectly clear: He is against "forced integration" of the suburbs. By this he apparently means he will restrain his Administration from pressuring local communities to accept federally-subsidized low-income housing. Housing & Urban Development Secretary George Romney, especially, has wanted to use his department's broad grant authority as a carrot to money-starved suburban towns.

Romney also wants federal legislation to override local zoning codes. Connecticut Senator Abraham Ribicoff has just introduced a bill that says where a town accepts a facility of the federal government, or of a federal contractor (this includes most major corporations), it must accept housing that low-income families can afford. At this juncture, his bill, which certainly falls under President Nixon's ban on "forced integration," stands no chance whatever.

But new forces are working. Again, the Southern school integration battle yields a rough analogy. Southern big business, faced with regional tumult and upheaval, decided its interest lay in backing political leaders to grant a measure of integration. Big business has an even greater stake, positive and negative, in the zoning controversy. House and apartment builders, and mortgage lenders, have parted company with their real estate brothers over zoning, not the first time that political profits have sparked ideological dissension. Cracking the suburbs means a substantial new housing market. And builders are increasingly large corporations with more political muscle than the typical small businessman. They are deeply involved in large-scale land development—new towns and other planned communities—which present zoning codes discourage.

These codes, then, may fall under economic pressure. This will represent greater social justice. Whether it will bring a more humane urban environment is open to dispute. It depends on whether the nation moves toward some rational, enforceable, urban growth policies. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan once remarked, in urban affairs everything is related to everything else. Zoning offers a crucial demonstration.

Land-use zoning itself, of course, is not malevolent. Passage of zoning ordinances in the early years of this century was hailed as a triumph of rational planning over haphazard growth. But the cancerous spread of suburbs after World War II brought new uses. Zoning became the sovereign power the suburban community could wield

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to exclude people it didn't want. These turned out to be mostly poor people, especially black poor people.

Since zoning codes cannot come right out and ban the poor, suburban towns found a ready substitute: Simply making the price of admission to their community too high. The zoning devices were right at hand: Large minimum lot and house size requirements, expensive building standards, "architectural birth control," in the form of limits on how many bedrooms a house could contain, restrictive subdivision controls, and outright bans on apartments. In recent years, zoning barriers have proliferated wildly. In the tri-state New York metropolitan area (excluding New York City), for example, about half of the vacant land zoned for residential use requires single family houses on an acre or more of land. In flourishing Bergen County, New Jersey, half of the 70 communities bar new apartment construction. The effect is to price out housing that low- and moderate-income families can afford.

Why not, then, forget the suburbs and devote national resources to meeting the needs of the urban poor within present cities? This fundamental policy question requires a lengthy response. These points are enough for the present discussion: Opening up the suburbs should not emerge as an alternative to existing city renewal but as a concomitant. Creating adequate housing and jobs in today's cities is a long-range, horrendously complex task. National housing goals, including six million low-income units, cannot be met within present cities. The economic current runs strongly toward the suburbs.

This last point underscores the zoning battle's special urgency. The suburbs, not the cities, are where the job and housing action is. Unless low-income people knock down zoning barriers they will be denied their best immediate hope for improved living and working conditions.

As everybody knows by now, urban America is now suburban America. More Americans live outside central cities than inside. The speed of this shift is startling. In the decade of the 1960's, the national population grew by 12 percent. Fully three-quarters of this growth took place in the suburbs.

But this suburban explosion, again as everybody knows, has been strikingly selective. Again, its scope may surprise. During most of the 1960's, 90 percent of the non-white population gain took place in the cities, whereas 100 percent of the white population gain occurred in the suburbs. Recently, black movement out of the cities has picked up, but mostly to the aging, closer-in suburbs where blacks take over decaying housing the whites have abandoned.

The emergence of a black city and a white suburbs is accompanied by a widening mismatch between job opportunities and where the urban poor must live. Fully 80 percent of the new jobs created in large metropolitan areas appear in the suburbs. Many large cities have lost jobs while most, including New York, have captured only a small share of new work opening up within the metropolis. And the new jobs include most of the blue-collar and low-skill work that are the poor's traditional point of entry into industry.

The story is the same with housing. Suburbs take the lion's share—60 percent, 70 percent, even 80 percent—of new housing starts in large metropolitan areas. This trend will continue. Underlying the growth of houses and jobs in the suburbs is the availability of vacant land. In the nation's 20 largest urban areas, fully 99 percent of the vacant land lies outside the central city. This underscores the trend: Most future urban growth will take place in the suburbs around cities in which most of the urban poor must live.

They must live there, primarily, because the suburbs do not contain enough housing they can afford to live in. Builders want to build this housing and for the first time in many years considerable federal money is available for the subsidies that low-income families require. The big obstacle: those zoning codes.

Since the government will not act, social action groups are turning to the same weapons that broke the back of Southern school segregation: court suits against municipalities and direct pressure on business.

The legal attack is being built, case by case, in such states as California, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and New Jersey where important lower-court rulings have chipped away at discriminatory zoning. But this court attack sustained a serious setback recently when the Supreme Court, in a five to three decision, upheld a California law requiring that before public housing can be built in a community, a majority of voters must approve in referendum.

Several years ago, voters in San Jose reversed their own City Council's decision to permit low-income housing units in the town. Some poverty-agency lawyers challenged the referendum law as in violation of the 14th Amendment. A mixed bag of supporters—the National Urban Coalition, the National Association of Home Builders, the American Institute of Architects—participated in the suit. A three-judge federal court in California ruled that the law was unconstitutional, but U.S. Supreme Court overturned this decision.

By holding that economic discrimination against the poor is not equivalent to racial discrimination, the Court has made future legal arguments against discriminatory zoning more difficult. Many lawyers feel, in fact, that exclusionary zoning opponents cannot look to a broad general ruling against the practice. Court action, they believe, must be seen primarily as part of growing pressure on legislatures, local, state, and federal government, to curb zoning excesses.

Still, despite this setback, other court suits are working their way through the system. Three critical ones show the current approach:

The NAACP and the National Committee Against

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Discrimination in Housing have filed suit against exclusionary zoning in Oyster Bay Town on Long Island. The town's zoning, this suit contends, has produced "an almost totally white, economically privileged community." The suit asks the court not only to declare the town's zoning unconstitutional but to require the community to prepare and implement a plan for integrating its housing. This is one of the broadest challenges to zoning so far.

Black Jack, Missouri is a white, middle-class town of 3,900 people a few miles north of St. Louis. For many years, it was unincorporated. Then, the citizens learned that a church-sponsored group planned to build some federally-subsidized low-income apartments in Black Jack. The community quickly incorporated and as its first act adopted zoning that bans apartments.

The American Civil Liberties Union initiated a court suit. With such clearcut issues at stake, it wants the Justice Department to intervene on its side, as that Department did for the first time in a similar case in Lackawanna, New York. Reportedly the decision to permit Justice to go into the case is now resting on President Nixon's desk.

A third case goes directly to jobs. Recently, the United Auto Workers joined the NCDH in challenging exclusionary zoning in Mahwah, New Jersey. This town limits residential construction to single-family homes on one-acre minimum lots. Mahwah is the site of a big Ford assembly plant employing some 5,000 workers, 40 percent off whom are black. Only 1,000 or so can live even in Bergen County, let alone Mahwah itself. Many face long daily commuting trips. A town that accepts the tax benefits of industry, argues the UAW and its ally, should not be allowed to exclude workers. This case takes on special importance in the light of the San Jose decision. It was brought before the state Civil Rights Division and will be settled, if necessary, in state, not federal courts.

A fourth action points to direct pressure against a company, not a municipality. The Suburban Action Institute has filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission seeking to prevent RCA from opening an executive office building in New Canaan, Connecticut. Its contention: that RCA should not move where its lower-paid employees can't live. SAI earlier brought similar action against another company that moved to Stamford, Connecticut.

Even people who would rejoice at seeing "snob" zoning destroyed, flinch at the notion of a great new wave of building engulfing the suburbs. Private builders "developed" our present suburbs and the prospect for more of the same is disheartening. The present attack on zoning comes, in fact, at a time when suburbs are reeling under twenty years of mindless growth. Traffic-choked roads, soaring mounds of garbage for which there is no room, pollution, ticky-tacky and blandness, skyrocketing municipal budgets, taxes going wild—these are increasingly the lot of the suburbanite.

Fair zoning should be achieved in the context of correcting these serious problems. Jobs and housing should be related, new urban centers fostered, urban sprawl reined in, public transportation reinvigorated and open spaces made secure. The first move should be to reform local taxes.

Suburbanites argue that much of their zoning is defensive. As their taxes soar, they begin to apply a basic test to newcomers: Can they pay their own way? New families, especially poor families, bring children to be educated and other demands for expensive services. Industry, on the other hand, has no children to educate, especially if the town makes sure its workers must live elsewhere. And it pays high taxes.

Each town's effort to maximize its own interest at its neighbors' expense grossly distorts the economic development of the metropolis. It makes the serious national housing shortage impossible to fill. It Balkanizes the entire region and makes sensible planning virtually impossible.

The entity best able to remedy all this is the state government, which possesses full power over all the municipalities within its boundaries. State legislatures, though, are dominated by suburban and rural representatives for whom tampering with local zoning is politically hazardous. Yet, the critical problems of suburbs, and cities, are preparing the ground for change.

Massachusetts now has a law requiring its towns to set aside a percentage of their vacant land for low-income housing. New York's Urban Development Corporation holds the power to override local zoning. Other states are considering creating strong land development authorities, following the federal lead in pushing large-scale planned communities in which, as noted earlier, business stakes are large. Such pressure, plus their own worsening plight, may outweigh present suburban hostility.

It is risky, of course, especially to those who view business as a doubtful partner in any fight for social justice. But risk or not, the civil rights battlefield of the 1970's is the suburban town not the urban ghetto. It will show how much, or how little, white middle-class Americans have learned about easing the birth of social change.

Summer Schedule

In keeping with the usual practice, *Commonweal* will again appear on alternate weeks during the summer months. Forthcoming issues will be dated June 11, June 25, July 9, July 23, August 6, August 20, September 3 and September 17. From then on we will resume our normal weekly publishing schedule.

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THE SCREEN

Pauline Kael has been "Raising Kane," and *Village Voice* critic Andrew Sarris is very upset about it. "Raising Kane" is the title of a two-part, book-length essay Miss Kael published in *The New Yorker* to mark the thirtieth anniversary of *Citizen Kane*, and Mr. Sarris is miffed because the essay is an attack on the *auteur* status of Orson Welles. Miss Kael sorts out four different cinematic traditions that she believes were synthesized in *Kane*: 1) the Hollywood tradition of newspaper movies into which Kane fits, 2) the tradition of the "actor manager of the old theater, . . . the man on-stage running the show, pulling it all together," into which Welles fits, 3) German Expressionist cinema into which she ingeniously links Kane's director of photography, Gregg Toland, and 4) the expatriate culture of Eastern wits and journalists who came to Hollywood in the '30s. This last influenced the making of *Kane,* she believes, through the person of scriptwriter Herman Mankiewicz—a man whose importance to the film has been grossly underrated, especially by Welles.

Despite Sarris' objections, Miss Kael's source-hunting is impressive. (Sarris has for years been complaining that there ought to be more academic rigor in film criticism: he should not now fault Miss Kael for having taken his advice and arrived at conclusions he doesn't like.) But Sarris seems to have been provoked more by a point of interpretation than by any question of historical accuracy. He is very severe with Miss Kael for having criticized the "Rosebud gimmick," as Welles himself has referred to it.

Rosebud is a crucial issue, there's no doubt about that. The film begins as Kane dies with the word "Rosebud" on his lips, and the subsequent story of his life is revealed through the efforts of a newsreel reporter to find out what the word means. By conducting interviews and doing some research the reporter collects five people's versions of what Kane was like, but he never does get the scoop on Rosebud. Unfortunately, however, the omniscient camera eye discloses that Rosebud is the name of a sled Kane had as a boy—before inherited wealth tore him away from his mother. Welles has blamed this revelation on Mankiewicz and said it's "dollar-book Freud." Miss Kael devalues it even further by calling it "penny-dreadful theatrics."

But Rosebud can't be written out of the script that easily. The perplexing thing about *Kane* is that its vices are also its virtues, and Rosebud is the prime example. The Rosebud gimmick is as essential to the narrative structure of the film as it is superfluous to the psychology of Kane. The irony is that Rosebud's mystery has to be investigated, but ought not to be solved. I suspect Welles went for the Rosebud gimmick because it reflected symbolically what he wanted to be as an actor in his film: a single, all-embracing expression of Kane's character. But this desire of his to be "onstage pulling it all together," like his willingness to let Rosebud serve as a clarification of the film's mysteries, goes against the grain of what is truly grand and original in the film. The art of the film does depend on the character of Kane; yet both the art and the character reside not in any symbol or even in the physical presence of the man who plays Kane, but in the multiple points of view from which Kane is described.

Welles used to worry that his acting was too intellectual, but in *Kane* it was perhaps not intellectual enough to match his interests as a director. For *Kane* is really a film about an abstraction rather than a man—a film less about a newspaper tycoon than about power. The implication of the film's narrative structure is that Kane represents power so vast he cannot be confronted and comprehended directly: he must be surrounded by at least five narrators if we are to see him at all. Kane himself should remain, like Gregg Toland's half-lit sets, a composite of murky, seemingly limitless spaces.

Before we meet Kane, we see that newsreel the reporter is supposed to be improving with his Rosebud angle. It may not please his editors, but that newsreel gives us an introduction to Kane that's appropriate. It reviews a public life that fits the private self we'll find in the interviews later. It shows Kane as a mass of political inconsistencies that cannot be resolved. It previews for us the absolute corruption of the American spirit Whitman celebrated in "Song of Myself." "Do I contradict myself?" Whitman proclaimed. "Very well then I contradict myself,/ (I am large, I contain multitudes.)"

But Welles could not quite bring himself to accept the impossibility of acting out this enormity. He wanted to encompass as an actor all those contradictions which, as a director, he sensed in Kane. And the director in him wasn't strong enough to control the actor. Miss Kael makes a good deal of Welles' early vocation as a magician. She sees in *Kane* Welles' relish for illusion, particularly in the impression the film creates that there are huge crowds present. But the personality of Kane should be mostly illusion too—an illusion created by the narrators—not a projection of Orson Welles. Kane is best played when underplayed in the early scenes. But in the later scenes, especially those of rancor and violence, Welles tried too hard to act up to the power he felt Kane had now assumed. In his desire to give himself enough stature to *present* Kane, Welles resorted to certain tricks he'd use again in later films—such as having himself shot from a knee-level camera angle with a low ceiling overhead.

By associating Welles with the tradition of the actor-

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manager, Miss Kael offers us an appropriate and helpful metaphor for what might less charitably be called Welles' egotism. His is the self-importance of the impressario, and it is a quality in him that's interfered with his subsequent filmmaking. Some of Welles' later movies—*Mr. Arkadin,* for instance, or *Touch of Evil*—suggest he's still trying to perfect that ultimate role whose total fulfillment eluded him in *Kane*. He continues to resist submission to the otherness demanded by a role. His acting avoids the chameleon habits of naturalism so vigorously that changing roles sometimes seems to mean little more for him than exchanging putty noses. Meanwhile he's also put on weight as if he were trying to grow physically into the spirit of the Kane role as he conceived it—or as if he were making sure that when he's on the screen, we'll find it impossible to suppose he's anyone besides the unmistakable Orson Welles.

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.

SECOND LOOK

The Neglected Prophecy Of James Kavanaugh

EUGENE C. KENNEDY



JAMES KAVANAUGH has been called many things since, dark Irish good looks flashing above his white roman collar, he became a many-mediaed celebrity discussing his book *A Modern Priest Looks at His Outdated Church* (Trident, 1967, $4.95). I would like now to call him a prophet, not because I think he possesses a clear and reasoned vision of the church and its future but because of the predictive quality of his own experience. Like a poet writing about the future and not knowing it, Kavanaugh, because of his personal vulnerability to life, felt the shifting in the firmament of the church and reacted to it in advance of others. Kavanaugh's journey out of the institutional church is now as familiar as it was singular just four years ago. His painful experience of tearing himself away from the Catholic culture (yet not quite fully away at that), his continuing search for a reliable center of gravity for his life, and his struggle to express a new and comfortable identity: these foreshadowed what so many other Christians have come to know on a delayed basis in their own lives.

I do not think that it helps the cause of understanding what is happening in the church just to put Kavanaugh down, although many of us indulged in that in something of the old "question box" style that handily refuted those disturbing questions about Galileo, Anglican orders, or the Inquisition. The problem with Kavanaugh, as many priests who have debated with him on radio or television have discovered, is that, beneath all the seeming anger and inconsistency, he is absolutely right about many of the difficulties in the church.

It does not help to dismiss him as some form of neurotic who was not well-adjusted to the priesthood or the church. Good riddance is a poor Christian salutation for anyone, and we are in bad shape if we think that neuroticism erases significance. Cries of pain are always informative and, as a matter of fact, what the less well adjusted experience as uncomfortable in one generation becomes the problem of better adjusted persons in the next generation.

There Are Men Too Gentle To Live Among Wolves

JAMES KAVANAUGH

Nash Pub. Co., $3.95

Kavanaugh has been trying to tell us just how personally uncomfortable it can be to live in the service of a church which has not resolved its own conflicts about its attitudes toward human beings. That is what, through his plaguing self-absorption, he has written into his books and poems; it shows through in his recently published book of verse, *There Are Men Too Gentle to Live Among Wolves.*

It would be difficult to think of a more pretentious title, but it tells us something about a man who has been hurt by life and who is puzzled still by the source of it all, a vulnerable man who sees himself as innocent in a contrary world. The verse is banal and self-indulgent, but that may not be the point if something about this man's particular sensitivities make his present struggle one that many others may shortly experience themselves. Perhaps, in words not quite so revealing as Kavanaugh's, many Catholics will be saying that their "easy God is gone" and will wonder where their love is hiding and "Will you come? Tomorrow."

Kavanaugh keeps saying "remember, remember" in the "quiet mornings" during which he looks for comfort from nature, and longs for the "little boy" who once was there. The poems

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are not much; the point is that they are the words wrenched out of a searcher, an alienated common man who has not moved easily away from the shadow of the church and who longs for human anchor points. A restless and self-concerned man who cannot, it seems, get close to or hold on to love. But a very human man, who cannot be dismissed because he is sentimental, one who should be understood now for what he says about the problems of trying to live without the church. They are not much less painful than the problems of living with it.

Kavanaugh has indeed ridden point on a great many priests and other Catholics who, when he first clenched his fist at the institutional church, never dreamed that they would soon separate themselves from it. And many others, who have chosen to recommit themselves to their ministry or to the church, have found themselves in a tangle of unexpected doubts and questions not too dissimilar to those raised by Kavanaugh. Some of the names most familiar in the renewal of the church could be put on that roster. Recall, for example, the reviews of Kavanaugh's first book. Many of the reviewers are gone now themselves, although, reading back over what they wrote then, one would not have predicted such behavior. These men are not inconsistent, or some kind of easily denounced turn-coats; they too are human beings who only in the wake of Kavanaugh and largely independent of his direct influence had to deal with the same wave of problems.

Kavanaugh's role as a harbinger does not end with his first book. *The Birth of God* (Trident, 1969, $4.95) was bombed by the critics and, despite his personal plugging of it on the electronic interview circuit, was not a big seller with the public. The work, dragging like a downed parachute with self-references, touched on the various "myths" that had become a part of Christian life and belief. The book, no matter how it was written or documented, raised bothersome questions about why and how man creates some aspects of his beliefs for himself. Kavanaugh was, as a matter of fact, moving as a popular writer into an extremely significant area a little ahead of his time. People want their myths left as much intact as possible even when they no longer hold together very well. So Kavanaugh was on somewhat dangerous ground with his second book; you do not monkey with the membrane of myth that holds people together and get away very readily with it.

Unpopular but Portentous

Kavanaugh's book was not the popular success he no doubt hoped it would be; but it was, by the thin edge of its subject if not for its substance, a portentous work. Now, not very long afterwards, the silent work of the scripture scholars is beginning to show up in the lives of Catholics everywhere. Louis Evely's rather simple-minded *The Gospels Without Myth* [Doubleday. $4.95] is on the way to being a best-seller, and men are confronted with the task of understanding the demythologized scriptures in a positive and constructive manner. It is not an easy challenge, especially since there are many ready to reduce the Gospels to fragments through overeager and unbalanced demythologizing.

The myth hunt is not centered only on the Bible, however. Throughout the church men are struggling with the very idea of myth as a positive mode of telling the truth, even as they examine the overgrowth of mythology on the priesthood and bishopric. Like it or not, Kavanaugh turned out to be a much better weathervane of our theological concerns for the early '70s than those who said it would center on hope or a new appreciation of play.

You can read Kavanaugh's book of poems one way and find them moderately successful at best. But you can read them another way as well and hear the voice of the man whose personal vulnerability makes him feel the shocks of life in advance of others.

This, then, becomes the book of the oracle too, the man telling of the lonely search that is in store for those who break away from their religious heritage not realizing how deep its roots run beneath the earth.

These poems were, according to Kavanaugh's introduction, "born in the pain of ending one life and beginning another, born in the excitement of the continuing search for life's meaning . . . a book for wanderers, dreamers and lovers, for lonely men and women who dare to ask of life everything good and beautiful. . . ." These do indeed seem the verses of a man who, now that the relief of leaving the church has evened off into everyday life, seems lonely and lost and who cannot really separate himself from the Catholic culture of which he was such a quintessential product. This book tells what it is like to cut away what was familiar and comforting in the church, and of the hole this leaves in a man's life. He has not found a new environment in which to re-identify himself as yet; so it may be for many who leave the church, or who feel they must in these days.

Like Bunuel or Joyce—in no way do I mean to class him with them artistically—Kavanaugh is still caught up with the Catholic church which he can neither leave alone nor escape fully. In particular, his new book reveals the situation of the Catholic who at first feels the relief of being free of the controlling presence of the church when he leaves it in one form or the other; it also tells how difficult is his journey when his need for faith and the supportive community of a church is still strong. The book tells something very personal beneath the self-infatuated style. James Kavanaugh is a lonely man who has mapped out the painful travels of the self-disenfranchised cultural Catholic. There is something to learn from this book, not least of all by the church which could perhaps, with a little more compassion and responsiveness, make these journeys unnecessary.

FATHER EUGENE C. KENNEDY, M.M., *is a counseling psychologist and author of several books, most recently,* A Time for Love *(Doubleday).*

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BOOKS

Reforming the military

Conscience and Command
EDITED BY JAMES FINN
Random House, $8.95 ($1.95 paper)

WILSON CAREY McWILLIAMS

Abuses in the system of military justice are not new. They were ignored in the past because, for most Americans, the soldier did not matter except as a symbol. Too much of today's "concern" is little different; injustice and protest against it are chiefly important when they result from or can be turned to the purposes of the anti-war movement. The soldier himself is little more than an object and an instrument to civilian America.

James Finn's book is welcome precisely because Finn does care about the soldier as a human being. It has other merits; Finn's interviews with the more notable protesters against injustice in the military are important political documents in their own right. And Finn and his contributors certainly make their case that military law and procedure, as embodied in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and as revealed in practice, are seriously in need of reform.

Change is necessary if only because we live in a different society than that which existed when the Code was drafted. Military men are painfully aware of the fact: trust in authority and feelings of obligation have all but vanished; civilian experience has made law seem a hostile and alien force, often justifiably; political and racial conflict has broken through the old illusion of calm. We may, like many professional soldiers, regret that this should be so, but all these changes make the Army a different institution already.

Military men, organizationally conservative and often sentimentally nostalgic about the Army of the past, often cling to the old rules. They suspect, too, that civilians are ill-informed about the requirements of military life when they are not simply hostile—and both suspicions have a measure of truth—which makes them regard proposals for reform as destructive or nihilistic. But the professional knows that today's recruit is not yesterday's, that order and discipline no longer grow naturally out of the old Code. His response has too often been the desperate effort to make severity and punishment substitute for civic morality and commitment, an attempt which is "revolutionary" in its own way because it seeks to preserve the semblance of discipline rather than trying to restore the best parts of the spirit and substance of good order in the military. Finn is right to argue that reform in military justice can result in "an armed force with no less strength, servicemen with higher morale, and a society with greater faith in its military institutions."

I doubt, however, that the contributors to *Conscience and Command* are able to prescribe for the Army despite their ability as critics. In the first place, they really do not come to terms with the difference between the military and the civilian political societies. In civil life, whatever the costs, we can afford to treat the protection of the individual's rights against the community as the central concern of law. In fact, we must to some degree. In mass America, no one can really ask civilians to trust authority or even many of their fellow citizens; where such trust is necessary—as with the President—we accept the need grudgingly, with whatever degree of conscious anxiety we can tolerate.

In the Army, trust and confidence are *mandatory*, part of the unwritten law of war and combat. The military must always regard the creation and protection of the community as its first concern. This is not because the "individual does not matter" but because he *does*. We allow wide areas of private liberty in civilian life precisely because



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few people matter very much to the community. In military life, especially in combat units, each man and his relation to his fellows are critical matters of common concern and military law must begin with that fact. "Barracks larceny," for example, is a serious military offense regardless of the money value of the property stolen. A similar logic lies behind Article 117 of the Code which forbids "provoking and reproachful words or gestures toward any person." Military law will always be partly at odds with civilian law so long as the Army needs to combat the privatizing tendencies of civilian life.

It is not hard to make a case even for the military ban on public political activity. In civilian life, most groups and relationships either develop a common ideology or informally ban "touchy" issues. No lawyer or businessman is surprised if vocal political involvement affects his clientele, while we are suspicious of too-partisan judges precisely because men of different ideas may have to be subject to their authority. It is vitally important in the Army for soldiers to believe that their fellows will behave toward them *as soldiers*—more vital, in fact, than the civilian's confidence that a judge will act judicially—and that they can rely on racists or Republicans not to betray or abandon them because they hold differing views. It can be argued that the ban is ineffective in this respect—it did not keep Communists from quitting in France in 1940—but not that it is nonsensical. The problem is that war, the central business of the military, is inherently a political issue and the two spheres can never be kept apart. But liberals—who were less than eager to protect General Walker's "freedom of speech," and with reason—should at least see the dilemma.

The central issue, again, is the fact that individuals matter. That has helped the Army to develop what is, in part, a wiser psychology than the bureaucratic rationalism of so much liberal theory. Words, insults, and gestures are not irrelevant matters: they touch men profoundly. For Edward Sherman, the selective enforcement of Article 117 is an argument for removing the rule; for anyone concerned with military community, the same evidence would demand more uniform and stringent enforcement.

Nor will it do to argue, as Sherman does, that police and firemen "demonstrate that men can function effectively . . . under a normal civilian superior-subordinate relationship." Sherman's faith in bureaucratic rationality might be touching were it not so dangerously absurd. The image of the police as the model of subordination to the authority of mayors and city councils—even to that of commissioners—will provoke either a smile or a shudder, especially given proposals for a voluntary army. The critical problem of all military command, as Sherman ought to know, is not whether an Army can "function effectively" but whether it can do so as the instrument of a democratic, civilian society. And "normal" relationships will not suffice not only because war is abnormal but because the amount of force at the Army's command is abnormal. This is not to argue that rigid caste hierarchy is necessary; it is to insist that simple analogies from civilian life are misleading at best—and Sherman's may be one of the worst.

Possibly most of my disagreement turns on Finn's faith that "what is at work in society today is a renewed perception of the individual person, of what he may become in a true community." There are some—Finn among them—for whom this is true. But much of what is "at work in society" is simply liberal individualism gone insane in a world where personality has been lost in the loneliness that passes for freedom. The Army has deserved better than that, and proposals for reform must come from those, like Finn himself, who know that community and pride play their role in the making of a man.

REVIEWERS

WILSON C. MC WILLIAMS, author of the forthcoming *The Idea of Fraternity in American Politics*, teaches political science at Livingston College, Rutgers.

RALPH MC INERNY is associate editor of *The New Scholasticism*, published at the University of Notre Dame.

GEORGE N. SHUSTER, Assistant to the President of the University of Notre Dame, was Managing Editor of *Commonweal* from 1926-1938.

MF

ANTHONY BURGESS

Knopf, $5.95

RALPH McINERNY

If language is the house of being, Anthony Burgess has always gone with a pair and three of a kind and, in *MF*, his thirteenth novel, he has dealt the house of Atreus into play as well. A winner? A house of cards? Well, if you liked *A Clockwork Orange* and *Enderby* (revised) better than his others, you may feel that in *MF* Burgess has brought his special talent to a post-citric fruition.

In *The Novel Now*, Burgess revealed himself to be perhaps the best read novelist alive; in his books on Joyce he indicated his penchant for cabalistic prose. If there are writers' writers, Burgess is surely one of them, but he may be better described as a reading writer; his own prose verges toward the florilegium and the echoes, half-quotes, learned allusions and footnotes on the fly can make a certain sort of reader hug himself with joy. The demands his new novel makes are not unlike those an unbroken code would make; when the key to deciphering it is found the delight is distinctly cerebral. Perhaps it is a lot too much like taking one of those literary quizzes which show up in the book sections of Sunday papers. *MF* is a novel which communicates no emotion, however, and it is this, I think, which makes it less than a success.

MF is Miles Faber who as narrator looks back from a future vantage point on the distinctly contemporary events which make up the novel. Like his creator, Miles is an encyclopedia of unlikely information but this quirky erudition is made functional in the novel since its

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peripeties and discoveries turn on the unriddling of poems and other dark sayings.

Miles, fresh from a public and protestant copulation, decides to go to the isle of Castita to study the works of Sib Legeru. Agents of his dead father put obstacles in his way so that they can get his sister Catherine off Castita first. They fear the possibility of incest, the family weakness. On Castita, Miles meets his double, his double's mother, meets and marries Catherine, etc., etc. In the course of all this, Miles makes as well as unmakes riddles. Here is one he constructs on the name Pardaleos:

Crack back, valley, and be shown
A Roman mouth, a Roman bone.

Since this is not a crucial riddle, I shall run the risk of dullness and interpret: Rap, dale, and the ambiguous, in Latin, *os*.

Unless you enjoy this sort of thing, you are not going to enjoy *MF*. Unless you like stories whose underpinnings are the myths of Greek tragedy, you are not going to like *MF*. Unless moral generalizations elevated on the antipodes of incest and miscegenation interest you, you are not going to be interested in *MF*. One would feel a good deal happier about this novel if it did not seem so open an invitation to be made the subject of interpretative papers in PMLA.

With *MF*, Burgess invites, even demands, comparison with writers of the ilk of Nabokov and Joyce. And yet, despite his exuberance and creativity and clear delight in all he does, he seems here to have chosen a roadway of fiction on which there is no mirror. Most novels provide forms for experience by insinuating themselves into the kinds of emotion out of which ordinary experience is constructed. A novel like *MF* assumes language as its subject, language as it has been used in art of the more direct sort but as no longer functioning directly. We are tugged, not toward the concrete or a simulacrum of it, but rather in the direction of abstraction, of bloodless cogitation, and it is on that level, if at all, that this artifact to the second power connects with life, by connecting with abstractions formulated against backgrounds other than art. Could this be said of Nabokov and Joyce? I think not. Burgess suffers from the comparison he invites. The second-order, "literary" delight *MF* occasions leaves one curiously dissatisfied, or maybe the dissatisfaction is not curious after all. A reader who, like myself, prefers the trilogy *The Long Day Wanes* and novels like *Devil of a State, A Vision of Battlements, The Right to an Answer*—indeed *Enderby* in its original form (*Inside Mr Enderby*)—has a way, within the Burgess canon, of explaining his dissatisfaction with *MF*. Those novels came out of Burgess' entrails; *MF*, like *A Clockwork Orange*, issued from his extraordinary mind and no amount of symbolic sex and violence gives them flesh, tactility, artistic substance.

Anthony Burgess is among the half dozen most important English novelists writing today. He is surely one of the most intelligent. No writer can know too much but a writer's knowledge has to be assimilated and rendered almost visceral in order to count in a novel. In most of his novels, Burgess harnesses his learning to his imagination and the results are exceptional eliciters of aesthetic effect. His facility and range are awesome and one toasts his fecundity and hopes for a multiple issue. *MF*, seen within his *oeuvre*, appears to be a finger exercise, a display, an unrealized piece of pyrotechnic for which, as for second class relics, we should be grateful. Grateful and at the same time hopeful that he will go back to putting his imaginary frogs into real gardens.

The Nazi Olympics

RICHARD D. MANDELL

Macmillan, $7.95

GEORGE N. SHUSTER

Mr. Mandell's idea of remapping the contours of the Olympic Games of 1936, virtually presided over by Adolf Hitler, and in so doing to raise questions about the role of sports in promoting interracial and international understanding is an excellent one. His story begins with the original Olympic concept, and it is a great, great story. Unfortunately from my point of view it is written in the style of Howard Fast rather than that of Red Smith, but this should not dissuade anybody interested from reading it.

During the 1890's Coubertin, a French aristocrat with money, worked harder than a beaver and a mole combined to get what he called the "Olym-

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pic Games" started. He was a patriot convinced that his country would not have been so badly trounced in 1870 by the Prussians if the physical education of its youth had not been neglected. Perhaps this reasoning was not altogether sound, but at any rate the first Games were staged in Athens during 1896. Once established these contests became illustrious symbols of international cooperation and solidarity, as well as of what education as a whole might accomplish for peace, if it were endowed both with freedom and imagination. Then the shadow of Hitler was thrown over the whole enterprise. The sworn expunger of Jews and Christians alike was to preside over the bearing of the lamps of Olympus to Berlin in 1936 and was sure to have seen to it that the most grandiose propaganda show ever devised for such an occasion would be witnessed by all who attended.

This is exactly what it turned out to be; and we of the United States countered with Jesse Owens, to whose existence as a truly human being Hitler could not assent in principle. Perhaps the most extraordinary contribution to the spectacle was that made by Leni Riefensthal, a cinematographic genius. We Americans treated her abominably after the war, but perhaps somebody could still dig up her story. Yet not even she could imagine what Hitler was already then planning to start, namely the enormous bloody pageant of the Second World War.

Every chronicler makes some mistakes, but Mandell rather overdoes it. I shall refer only to two. He says that during many years after the 20th century dawned, only Ivy League schools tried to make Negro (they were not Black then) athletes feel at home. I have every reason to recall that in the early '20s Iowa University's Duke Slater reduced his opponent at the tackle spot, Notre Dame's big and brawny Hector Garvey, to one third of his size. There are mistakes about German history, too, and one of them ought to be erased once and for all. The total number of victims of the Nazi blood purge of 1934 was not "thousands" but less than 250. If you use the vague "thousands" figure you strip this purge of its macabre character as a quite personal murder business.

Strong opposition to American participation in the Berlin Olympics was voiced by a number of groups, and it may well be that one little shove more and the Fuehrer's face would have been slapped resoundingly. Mr. Mandell refers in this connection to the attitude by *Commonweal* at the time. What we said editorially was reprinted on the front page of the New York *Times*. We did not mention the Archbishop of Baltimore by name, but said "a bishop" was pledged to support our stand. By the next day the Chancellor of the Archdiocese of New York, then Bishop McIntyre, having conferred with Avery Brundage, released a public statement to the effect that the Archdiocese thoroughly disapproved of the *Commonweal*'s stand and indeed endorsed American participation in the Olympics. That of course killed opposition. What is more, he demanded an apology from us; and I think that our response to that demand was one of the nobler episodes in the earlier history of the magazine. I should add that later on Bishop McIntyre frankly regretted his action in this matter. It still seems to me that staying away from Berlin in 1936 would have been a good and glorious deed. Perhaps it might even have postponed the outbreak of the war.

CORRESPONDENCE

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(Continued from page 275)

astical oppression have realized the hopeless situation facing them and quietly left the system; one does not find them at Catholic parish club meetings. Only the thoroughly-conditioned woman or the happy woman who enjoys her subservient, less-demanding role can possibly ascribe to the church's practices. No wonder that the parish club women were antagonistic to Patricia Young's ideas! The women who are receptive to liberationist ideas have left the church long ago.

And can we blame them? The Catho-

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lic church will never be relevant for women unless, as a starter, the seminary opens up its doors to everyone, men and women alike. The vocation of serving in the priesthood, serving God most fully, performing the Sacrifice of the Mass, etc., should be open to girls as well as boys. Really, are the women any less holy than men? Are they less academic? (Who used to memorize their catechism lessons more faithfully, the conscientious little girls or the boys with paper airplanes in the back row?) The exclusion of women from the priesthood is an unjust practice which neglects the religious needs of over 50% of society.

In addition, there is no place for women in the Roman church as long as Catholics insist that a priest must be celibate to have the time and energy for priestly duties. These people say that a man serves *either* his community *or* a wife and family, implying that loving a woman and priestly duties are mutually exclusive. The church does not recognize that in true "Christian" (Christ-like) love, the loving and serving of one's fellow man, including the community, is related closely with that of a spouse; oftentimes, two heads are better than one. In any case, the option should always be open for marriage or celibacy, for the female or male priest to decide for him/her self.

These are only two brief examples of the church's male-oriented concept of "Christian" love. Although "women's lib"-type articles may appear from time to time in *Commonweal*, all of us, especially the Catholic women, ought to recognize the prejudicial practices which are basic to the Roman Catholic church.

KENNETH K. MURRAY

Language and Theology

East Cleveland, Ohio

To the Editors: If Gregory Baum's theologizing [Apr. 9] is as careless as his use of words, then I certainly hope that he doesn't have too much of a hand in the "church's ongoing, authoritative self-definition."

One of his key words is "historicity" ("We acknowledge the historicity of all truth"), a term that Baum takes to mean: "conditioned by historical circumstances" despite the dictionary's insistence that it, in fact, means: "historical authenticity, having actually occurred." However, if Baum is so eager to reshape "ancient dogmatic formulas" in "accordance with the contemporary model of truth," I can well understand his unwillingness to let anything as humble as dictionary definitions impede his creativity.

But by what authority is he so creative? By authority of the "Spirit," a term that he makes such free use of? But what is the "Spirit"? Does he mean the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Trinity, as one of the ancient dogmas would have it? If so, what happens to his authority if he feels compelled to reshape this particular dogma to make Christianity more palatable to Hugh Hefner and Michael Butler and all the others who, today, "have different questions and understand reality in different categories"? But perhaps Baum is referring to some other Spirit, one that is more firmly based, one, in other words, that proceeds from Baum's own creativity, much as did his definition of "historicity."

Just as many priests and bishops need a sharp reminder that they are servants and not masters, so, too, I believe, some theologians should be made to realize that they are not creators, as novelists, poets, and even philosophers are creators, but mere translators, bound irrevocably by an origin upon which they may not attempt to improve.

Finally, I question Baum's presumption that the questions asked by men of this age are really so different. When one stands beside an open grave on a bitter February day listening to a shivering priest rushing through some prayers about the resurrection of the body and feels the pressure of a terrible nature upon all those at the graveside, the dogma of personal survival certainly runs counter to one's immediate experience, but did a man in similar circumstances in the Middle Ages feel any different? Faith, in other words, if it is to have any cogency, always has to run counter to much of one's experience. However reasonable the basis for one's faith might be, one must make Kierkegaard's leap, not once but time after time, if one is to be a believer in Jesus as the Christ.

Of course, if all the ancient dogmas are made to conform to the "contemporary model of truth" (and perhaps Hefner, Butler, Nixon, Marcuse, Herman Kahn, and the whole gang will get together someday and tell us precisely what this is), there'll be no need to make any leap. We can push aside the naive materialism of "the resurrection of the body and the life of the world to come" in favor of vital, significant, living right here and now until such a time as accident, or murder or cancer or senility or nuclear catastrophe or something else or any combination thereof rings down the final curtain on all our stimulating exchanges and loving relationships.

The Jansenists believed that Christ died only for the elect, but narrow as their thinking was, they shut out far fewer people than theologians such as

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

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Baum, who, with the intention of broadening the appeal of Christianity, seem bent on reducing it to a kind of Ethical Culture, which, paradoxically, will appeal only to a sophisticated leisure class who have no more authentic religious concern than one of Waugh's bishops.

MICHAEL GALLAGHER

Reply

When Kierkegaard spoke of "the leap," he beautifully and powerfully announced an aspect of the Christian faith. The passage from the surface of reality to its depth is never a gradual process, a painless passage, supported by good arguments: it is rather a willingness to let go the superficial view, however scientific it may be, to negate it, and to be open in utter darkness to the deeper meaning of reality. (This is even true for people who are not Christians.)

Kierkegaard was able to speak of the Christian faith with so much power because he used a language derived from the culture contemporary to him and dealt with the questions and problems people actually had in his time. In particular the analysis of consciousness and intensification of consciousness through negation preoccupied the post-Hegelian world then as it does now. While Kierkegaard differed vehemently from many of his contemporaries, he used their language and dealt with their issues. This is the reinterpretation of doctrine.

GREGORY BAUM

Total War & the NLF

Bryn Mawr, Pa.

To the Editors: I wish Michael Novak would clarify his April 30 remarks on the Calley case, to the effect that " 'total war' is a North Vietnamese concept," that "the Viet Cong baited the Americans into 'total war'," and that both North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front therefore "invited" it. These charges seem to constitute something more than a stylistic slip-of-the-pen, for Novak returns to them at several points in his article.

Is Novak seriously arguing that the NLF designed its tactics so as to coax U.S. bombers into an unprecedentedly inhuman assault on the peasantry and ecology of Vietnam? Is he implying that this is the only way the NLF could win converts over to its cause? Would Novak claim that any of the real mechanisms of *mass* murder and *mass* terrorism, which he himself catalogs—B-52 saturation bombings, free-fire zones, defoliation, gases and napalm, population "relocation"—was initiated by the NLF? If his answer to these questions is no, as I would expect, then exactly what *does* he mean?

My hunch is that Novak harbors some lingering hang-ups on Communists, revolutionaries, guerrillas, maybe even uniquely Asian types of warfare and killing. Whatever his reasons, I would point out to him that "total war" is most assuredly a Western concept (ask Raymond Aron) and is not to be confused with the essentially *political* struggle at the core of the "people's war" doctrine. Mass politics, in other words, has nothing to do with mass targeting.

Furthermore, in late 1964 the NLF —a purely *Vietnamese* force— was on the verge of victory in South Vietnam, a victory that would have been accomplished with negligible violence and bloodshed compared with what we have visited upon the Vietnamese people from the time we intervened massively to freeze the processes of their own social revolution. Until U.S. escalation, the NLF had, of course, carried out its share of throat slittings, disembowelings, and exemplary beheadings (all of which seem to repel Americans far more than phosphorus, napalm, anti-personnel pellets, and 7-ton bombs, for some inscrutable Western reason), but in the historical cost-benefit dimensions of revolution, these acts are within reasonable bounds. The NLF appears to have been, and to remain, substantially more selective and discriminating in its reprisals against elements of its indigenous population than the Algerian FLN from 1957 to 1962. (The "proper" fate for Quislings, *Harkis*, Thieus and Kys is something to be taken into account here, one might think.) Did these Algerian FLN actions, in Novak's eyes, "invite" French *ratissage* operations, which, like American warfare in Vietnam, were grotesquely out of proportion to the scale of revolutionary violence they were quite consciously designed to crush? Would Novak, moreover, care to compare NLF brutalities with those of the Diem government or its successors in South Vietnam?

The clincher, as Novak might agree, is that the way the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs is none of our damn business. And the fact is—contrary to what Novak seems to be *saying*, however— that our own mounting barbarism in Vietnam eventually evoked an increasing number of isolated—as opposed to generalized—acts of savagery by the NLF. But

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where does the basic responsibility lie?

By the way, I'd also caution Novak against accepting "Viet Cong atrocity" stories at face value. These headline-grabbers have a way of emanating from "captured enemy documents" that surface, *mirabile dictu*, just when world opinion is being focused on the latest U.S. outrages. The great multiplication of the NLF's 1968 "Hué executions" took place in November 1969, just as the Mylai revelations were appearing; Duc Duc hit the TV screens, (with few conclusive details) at the moment of Calley's conviction in March 1971. The problem is one of separating fact from Pentagon public relations. To Novak and other *Commonweal* readers, I strongly recommend Edward Herman's *Atrocities in Vietnam: Myths and Realities* (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1970).

RICHARD B. DUBOFF

Infallibility

Indore, India

To the Editors: In a review of Küng's book on infallibility, in *Commonweal* of Feb. 5, 1971 (received only now by sea mail), Charles Davis leaves my book, *Infallibility and the Evidence*, "out of account . . . because, if it boldly rejected infallibility, its fundamental approach to Scripture prevented one from taking it seriously as a piece of theology."

To this I have two major objections. The doctrine of infallibility (of the church and only derivatively of the pope) is based on a fundamental approach to Scripture, and as long as this approach is accepted as valid by the church authorities and the great majority of its priest and lay members and by most believing Christians outside the R.C. church, the doctrine can only be met effectively and defeated on its own fundamental ground. This is what I have tried to do, and the approach is valid, even if the fundamental position itself should be unsound. Küng, on the contrary, refuses even to consider the Roman proofs from Scripture. In half a sentence he simply dismisses them as based on an exegesis which approaches the texts with a prejudice—one different, that is, from his own.

My second objection is that my fundamental position consists only in a refusal to accept the in some theological circles fashionable prejudice against the possibility of miracles, which, for believers in a God-Creator, is itself logically improbable, if not absurd. It is this prejudice which compels the neo-modernists to adopt largely unsound rationalizations in order to do away with the historical reliability of N.T. Scripture. Their prejudice makes it impossible for them to take seriously the well-substantiated claim made by the disciples that they received and obeyed a command from Christ to be witnesses (not inventors of legends), and forces them, against the overwhelming daily experience of all older people, to refuse to believe that after 30-50 years there were still substantially accurate memories of some of the great events that took place around Jesus. Once you throw a head-switch, as the prejudice against miracles, the lights go out over a large area of common human knowledge, experience, and logic.

If miracles are not possible and if the gospel accounts are not substantially reliable, there is no reason why people —apart from theologians who make a hobby and living out of the subject— should still be interested in Christianity as a religion. In the wake of neo-modernism millions of former believers have already drawn that conclusion.

As for Küng's book, the thesis which he makes the starting-point: that, within the system, the illicitness of the use of contraceptives must be considered an infallible doctrine of the ordinary magisterium, this was already argued by me in my book (p. 116-117).

Küng bases his own main argument against the infallibility of particular propositions on the imperfection of our knowledge and our limited powers of linguistic enunciation. This argument will hardly convince ecclesiastical authorities and others, since there are literally millions of propositions (in mathematics, history, geography, and other fields) which people consider certain enough and clearly enough expressed to call them substantially and unalterably true. His book is mainly invalid because it refuses to take seriously and to meet the scriptural arguments on which the church bases its position. This, as far as the infallibility of the church is concerned, was also left undone by George Salmon in his great book against infallibility. It is precisely this that I have attempted to do.

(MOST REV.) F. SIMONS
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